DIFFERENCES IN STRATEGIC PERCEPTION!
De
titel van het onderstaande artikel van Graham Fuller is onvolledig Het gaat
over veel meer dan de genoemde personen en de plaats van Rusland in deze
wereld.
Het
gaat over een Amerika dat zijn glans aan het verliezen is en krampachtig aan
zijn Imperiale Status probeert vast te houden. Een tanende grootmacht met het
grootste ‘Militaire Industriële Complex’ (MIC) op deze planeet. https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Militair-industrieel_complex
Eisenhower,
de voormalige militair, was degene die het best begreep dat er in de
Amerikaanse wapenindustrie sprake was van een structurele verstrengeling niet
alleen van wapenfabrikanten met het leger, maar ook van die twee met het Congres.
Zijn kleindochter Susan, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Susan_Eisenhower een vooraanstaande deskundige op het gebied
van de Koude Oorlog, zegt dat haar grootvader begreep dat ‘het Congres deel
uitmaakte van een Driehoek’. Deze verwevenheid heeft de Amerikaanse
wapenindustrie de cynische naam bezorgd: ‘Militair Industrieel Congressioneel
Complex (MICC) of ook wel ‘de IJzeren Driehoek’.
In
hoeverre is dit Complex mede verantwoordelijk voor de militarisering van de
Amerikaanse buitenlandse politiek en de daarmee gepaard gaande duizenden slachtoffers?
Graham Fuller: “Non-stop
American wars and their consequences are the greatest threat. Washington’s choice
of primarily military means to handle contemporary radical trends in Muslim
societies has not only failed to solve them, but has demonstrably exacerbated
them. We are fighting on more fronts against radicalized Muslims than ever
before”.
Graham Fuller is in staat een helder inzicht te geven
hoe na de Koude Oorlog de belangen van de EU en Amerika niet meer convergeren,
maar geleidelijk aan steeds verder uiteen lopen en dat dat voor ons een Wake-up Call
zou moeten zijn voor het varen van een eigen koers!
NB
VERAX: donderdag 25 mei 2017 DE NAVO EEN GEVAARLIJK BLOK AAN ONS BEEN?
Trump, Putin and Russia’s Place In The World
June 06, 2017
President Trump’s ignorant, oafish and crude foreign policy style rivets
our attention, arouses our indignation. But the drama of the diplomatic mayhem
he wreaks while traveling abroad also distracts from recognizing more serious
underlying problems of US policy— deep negative trends that predate Trump.
Focusing on Trump’s latest crude pronouncements encourages the soothing
belief that these current dilemmas are all his doing. In other words, if we
didn’t have Trump, the US would be back in the comfortable saddle as world’s
acknowledged, respected, indispensable leader. The sad fact is, we can vent our
anger as we like, but the old days just aren’t coming back. It would indeed be
a huge relief to be able to attribute our current foreign policy mess to the
incompetence of one individual.
President Obama posed the reverse problem: his intelligent, gracious, sophisticated
and knowledgeable style lulled us into believing that all should be well on the
foreign policy front with the right guy in charge. But in reality the
gratifying nature of Obama’s style too, concealed on numerous fronts the
critical issues he failed to address or incorrectly addressed.
Inderdaad zou het heel prettig zijn geweest als we aan de horkerige proleet
Donald Trump of anders aan de infantiele ‘Reborn Christian’ George W Bush alle
Amerikaanse problemen toe konden te schrijven.
Deze problemen zijn tijdens het presidentschap van Barak Obama eerder toe
dan afgenomen. In zijn buitenlandse politieke optreden zijn er twee bewonderenswaardige feiten te melden.
Ondanks sterke oppositie van het thuisfront, het Congres en de media en de
dreigende taal van de Israëliërs, heeft hij een multilaterale overeenkomst
weten te sluiten waardoor de eventuele nucleaire ambities van Iran lijken te
zijn ingedamd.
In de tweede
plaats normaliseerde hij de betrekkingen met Cuba.
Jammer genoeg meende hij het door de Neoconservatieven geformuleerde
gedachtengoed van het Amerikaanse ‘Exceptionalisme’ nog steeds te moeten
uitdragen “Leader of the Free World” en de arbiter van ‘goed’ en ‘kwaad’ in de
wereld.
‘Dit leidde, na de catastrofe van Irak tot ‘Regime Change’ in Libië en een poging daartoe in Syrië .
We kennen de gevolgen! Gewelddadige acties waar ook wij bij betrokken waren. Al
deze acties hebben ertoe geleid dat Iran nu een centrale rol in het
Midden-Oosten speelt.
Deze Sjiitische ‘suprematie’ is niet alleen voor Israël een doorn in het oog maar ook voor de Soennieten in deze regio, zoals die van Saoedi-Arabië.
Israël dat door de enorme invloed van de eerder genoemde Neoconservatieven rekende op die centrale positie in het Midden-Oosten., die nu door Iran lijkt te worden ingenomen.
Deze Sjiitische ‘suprematie’ is niet alleen voor Israël een doorn in het oog maar ook voor de Soennieten in deze regio, zoals die van Saoedi-Arabië.
Israël dat door de enorme invloed van de eerder genoemde Neoconservatieven rekende op die centrale positie in het Midden-Oosten., die nu door Iran lijkt te worden ingenomen.
Het gebruik van ‘Drones’ om ‘vijanden’ te elimineren is ‘explosief’
gestegen. Het gevolg is dat inmiddels honderden onschuldige burgers het leven hebben
gelaten vooral in Afghanistan en Pakistan. De twee van de zeven landen waar deze ‘killing machines’ het meest werden
ingezet.
Who cares? We call it: ‘Collateral Damage’!
Who cares? We call it: ‘Collateral Damage’!
Inmiddels zijn minstens negentien landen druk doende om dit wapentuig aan
te schaffen.
Ook ISIS is geïnteresseerd!
Ook ISIS is geïnteresseerd!
Trump’s outrages are too numerous to deal with in one piece; here I’d like
to focus specifically on the recent brouhaha over NATO and questions about
Trump’s alleged destruction of America’s “reliability” as a partner in Europe.
Let me suggest a few key, perhaps contrarian, propositions of my own, drawn
from my perspective as a former “sovietologist,” and student of Russian culture
and affairs. I write this too, with overwhelming concern for the unprecedented
binge of American hysteria—there is no other word for it—over Putin and
Russia’s place in the world.
The words of Soviet expert on American foreign policy, Georgi Arbatov, to an American diplomat upon the collapse of the USSR, come back to haunt: “We are going to do a terrible thing to you, we are going to deprive you of your enemy.” Indeed the US has been thrashing around ever since.
Het ‘Witte Huis’ heeft in de tijd van Obama gemeend om Rusland opnieuw als de
‘grote vijand’ te zien. Het gevolg is dat de NAVO naar het oosten is
uitgebreid en oorloghitserige taal wordt gebezigd.
De Amerikaanse bemoeienis
met Syrië, altijd al een politiek interessegebied van de Russen, heeft de
Russen op hun beurt meer intensief doen betrekken bij de gewelddadigheden in
het Midden-Oosten. Deze betrokkenheid is niet alleen voor Bashar al-Assad van
grote betekenis maar verstevigd tevens de positie van Iran in de regio.
So, Trump has bluntly called upon the EU to shoulder a greater share of the burden in NATO’s upkeep. He is not wrong. Indeed, the EU very much should take far more responsibility on issues of global security—but not so much financially, but by determining, on its own for a change, what it perceives to be its own security problems and how to manage them.
De EU moet inderdaad zijn eigen veiligheidsproblemen ter hand nemen. Een
bewering die ik regelmatig heb onderschreven. De Amerikaanse perceptie van de
wereld is niet de onze! Hun gemilitariseerde buitenlandse politiek is niet die
van de EU. Een dergelijke politiek heeft uitsluitend zin als de ‘totale
overwinning’ tot de mogelijkheden behoort zoals de Tweede Wereldoorlog met een
welomschreven doel namelijk het verdrijven van het fascisme.
De ‘War on Terror’ valt niet te definiëren en is zonder definitie niet te
winnen. Ons gebrek aan introspectief vermogen heeft tevens voorkomen dat wij
mogelijk medeschuldig zouden kunnen zijn aan deze terreur.
NB Verax: zaterdag 10 juni 2017 (JEREMY CORBYN TRIES THE TRUTH) by Lawrence Davidson
NB Verax: zaterdag 10 juni 2017 (JEREMY CORBYN TRIES THE TRUTH) by Lawrence Davidson
Toen 9/11 de VS overkwam was de verklaring van deze terreuractie volgens
Bush dat men afgunstig was op onze welvaart en onze waarden. Dit soort naïeve
opmerkingen maakt van het huidige Terrorisme het Bijbelse ‘Kwaad’ zoals dat ook
wordt uitgedragen door de premier van het Verenigd Koninkrijk mevrouw May.
Zonder een ‘Totale Overwinning’ in
het vooruitzicht voldoet elke militaire ingreep aan de natuurkundige wet
‘Actie=Reactie’ en biedt dus geen enkele oplossing en is zelfs
contraproductief.
Het financiële aspect dat door de auteur Fuller zijdelings wordt genoemd is
wel degelijk van belang. Zolang de wereld niet zonder oorlogstuig lijkt te
kunnen is het niet nodig dat wij de Amerikaanse oorlogsindustrie ondersteunen.
De VS als leider van de NAVO met het grootste ‘militaire industriële complex’
ter wereld schroomt niet bij de koop van deze ‘Hardware’ zijn NAVO partners
onder druk te zetten om het Amerikaanse oorlogstuig te kopen. Daar zijn diverse
voorbeelden van. Zo werden de Polen gedwongen om de F-16 van Lockheed Martin te
kopen in plaats van de Franse Mirage 2000 van Dassault. Het laatste toestel presteerde beter en was
goedkoper.
De vraag rijst of de zgn. overeenkomst met de Amerikanen over de levering
van JSF (Joint Strike Fighter ons ook niet is opgedrongen? Het toestel is ontzettend duur geworden (voorspelbaar!) en diverse experts hebben ook al in het verleden op goede alternatieven gewezen. http://www.nu.nl/politiek/3387149/genoeg-alternatieven-dure-jsf.html#meerdere-alternatieven-voor-jsf-1
Onze afhankelijkheid van de VS op dat gebied scheelt werkgelegenheid en maakt ons geen deelgenoot van de innovatieve technische ontwikkelingen die deze verfoeibare industrie met zich kan meebrengen.
http://www.stopwapenhandel.org/sites/stopwapenhandel.org/files/imported/projecten/jsf/JSFartikelen/10keerneeVM.pdf
In today’s post-Soviet world the reality is that most of European political
culture no longer instinctively shares the American perspective on global
affairs.
The US is increasingly driven by a security- and military-dominated approach to handling international crises. This trend towards the militarization of American foreign policy has been growing by leaps and bounds, particularly since 9/11. America excels at “threat perception,” it’s what keeps US think tanks and arms industries in business.
The US is increasingly driven by a security- and military-dominated approach to handling international crises. This trend towards the militarization of American foreign policy has been growing by leaps and bounds, particularly since 9/11. America excels at “threat perception,” it’s what keeps US think tanks and arms industries in business.
Let’s take the proposition one step farther. Despite the many shrill voices
in Washington, Russia simply cannot be taken as “the greatest threat to
American security and welfare.” Non-stop American wars and their consequences
are the greatest threat.
Washington’s choice of primarily military means to handle contemporary radical trends in Muslim societies has not only failed to solve them, but has demonstrably exacerbated them. We are fighting on more fronts against radicalized Muslims than ever before. Yet these multiple simultaneous American wars bleed the budget, usurp funding for social infrastructure, maintain a culture of fear, and stimulate the growth of the security state. And yes, it’s gotten worse under Trump.
Washington’s choice of primarily military means to handle contemporary radical trends in Muslim societies has not only failed to solve them, but has demonstrably exacerbated them. We are fighting on more fronts against radicalized Muslims than ever before. Yet these multiple simultaneous American wars bleed the budget, usurp funding for social infrastructure, maintain a culture of fear, and stimulate the growth of the security state. And yes, it’s gotten worse under Trump.
Just look at the costs. The US suffers from the most massive gap between
rich and poor of any country in the developed world. This gap not only produces
economic hardship, but corrodes social unity, stimulates anger, bitterness,
divisiveness and feeds the paranoid attitudes that are directly responsible for
electing Trump in the first place.
There is no sign that the insatiable American embrace of non-stop war is
slackening—on the contrary. New crises emerge everywhere; there is virtually no
area of the world left that does not at some point require “urgent American
leadership” to preserve American “vital interests.”
But this perspective of what constitutes the “vital interests” of the West is no longer widely shared in Europe.
And it is simply extraordinary that there is zero discussion anywhere in US election campaigns or in the MSM to challenge the military budget.
But this perspective of what constitutes the “vital interests” of the West is no longer widely shared in Europe.
And it is simply extraordinary that there is zero discussion anywhere in US election campaigns or in the MSM to challenge the military budget.
Nor for most of Europe is Russia anywhere remotely the greatest challenge
to their security and welfare. Massive refugee flows, immigration and their
resulting domestic tensions, costs of refugee absorption, and even Muslim
extremism are the true challenges.
Can we really believe that American military intervention in the Muslim world over the past few decades—resulting in the killing of at least two million Muslims—has not created profound ground for the ongoing backlash?
Can we really believe that American military intervention in the Muslim world over the past few decades—resulting in the killing of at least two million Muslims—has not created profound ground for the ongoing backlash?
Beyond security issues, the EU also urgently faces the need to reform
its economic bureaucracy to more fairly and equitably address the
economic and social problems of Europe. Here the EU places the highest priority
on preserving domestic tranquility, even while the US does not.
Starving Europe’s social and economic budgets to support greater military expenditures is not productive. Europe knows that.
Starving Europe’s social and economic budgets to support greater military expenditures is not productive. Europe knows that.
Global security is better served by preserving Europe’s own economic and
social order than by spending money on arming itself up at US behest for some
putative Russian military threat.
Let’s consider the Russian military threat. The US military budget alone is
greater than the combined budgets of the next eight military budgets combined
(including Russia and China.) Russia is a poor country with a modest military
budget.
Numbers aren’t everything of course, and US think tanks work overtime forging creative scenarios about how Russia can still actually defeat the US in a European conflict—justifying ever greater US military budgets.
Numbers aren’t everything of course, and US think tanks work overtime forging creative scenarios about how Russia can still actually defeat the US in a European conflict—justifying ever greater US military budgets.
But what do we think Russia is actually going to do? Invade Europe? In
reality Russia does not threaten the EU in any serious respect, as most
balanced European observers will admit.
It’s interesting here to look at how many times Russia has actually invaded
the West.
Looks like twice in two centuries—and both times in direct response to European invasions of the Russian heartland.
Looks like twice in two centuries—and both times in direct response to European invasions of the Russian heartland.
The first occurred under the Napoleonic Wars in the early 1800s. Napoleon,
as part of his campaigns to conquer most of Europe, foolishly invaded Russia in
1812. As the French were unable to get the strategically retreating Russian
army to seriously engage militarily, even at the gates of Moscow, the Russians,
aided by “General Winter” as Tolstoy puts it, chased Napoleon all the way back
into Central Europe. At that point the Russian army joined the grand European
coalition against Napoleon in Europe. Indeed, Napoleon’s disaster in Russia was
a turning point for the European war against Napoleon. The Russian army soon
thereafter went back home.
The second Russian invasion of the West was in the late days of World War
II. Here, as we know, Hitler fatally decided to invade Russia, where he spread
destruction, starvation and death. The Soviet Union, at the staggering
costs of upwards of 25 million Russians dead in the long
war, eventually drove Hitler back into Germany. Russia was more responsible
than any other country for the devastation of Hitler’s Wehrmacht. And Western
allies gave maximum support to the Red Army’s offensive against Hitler. Trouble
was, after driving the Germans back to Germany, Soviet forces didn’t go back
home. Stalin occupied all of Eastern Europe (and Karelia) subjecting it to
harsh Russian communist control and ideology for over 40 years.
These events represent the two extraordinary circumstances of Russian
invasion of the West. These conditions are not readily replicated.
For sure, Russia has played its part over the past two centuries in
numerous small military engagements around its periphery as part of the endless
European Great Power struggles for spheres of influence. But the same has been
true of every single major western power fighting battles in its periphery over
the years, including the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Austria,
Turkey and others. It is never comfortable for a small state to live next to a
great power anywhere.
Europe, by dint of proximity and experience knows and understands Russia
well. Germany above all is the one major power that will always bear the
primary responsibility for handling the Russian account in Europe; Russia and
Germany after all are the two major powers of Central and Eastern Europe. Here
Germany remains knowledgeable and sober-minded.
Since the fall of the ideological empire of the Soviet Union large segments of German public opinion are uncomfortable with American policies designed to push NATO up to the very gates of Russia. Such acts are viewed as highly provocative intrusion into an area of traditional Russian sphere of influence. Indeed, Germany’s last foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier recently spoke out against what he saw as “provocative” NATO exercises near the Russian border in the Baltics.
Since the fall of the ideological empire of the Soviet Union large segments of German public opinion are uncomfortable with American policies designed to push NATO up to the very gates of Russia. Such acts are viewed as highly provocative intrusion into an area of traditional Russian sphere of influence. Indeed, Germany’s last foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier recently spoke out against what he saw as “provocative” NATO exercises near the Russian border in the Baltics.
Yet Washington seems hard-wired to deprive Russia of its sphere of influence
anywhere it can, all the while finding it unacceptable that any power should
challenge, anywhere, the American sphere of interest. Indeed, the US has been
obsessed with Russia for over two centuries, especially on the religious,
cultural and ideological level.
Thus Washington persists in its own strategic view in which there can be no
win-win with Russia. (Trump actually spoke of trying to improve relations, only
to unleash the full wrath of the US security establishment upon his head.
Trump’s own unorthodox approach has not helped.)
Maintenance of overwhelming US power and strategic global reach —“full-
spectrum dominance” in Pentagonese—is the American strategic goal.
But that is not the European goal or the European perception of a future world order. Europe is far more readily willing to deal seriously, for example with Cuba, Iran, Palestine, China, and Russia, among others.
But that is not the European goal or the European perception of a future world order. Europe is far more readily willing to deal seriously, for example with Cuba, Iran, Palestine, China, and Russia, among others.
And Europe has been severely damaged by US-sponsored regime change wars in
the Middle East—witness Muslim terrorism and refugees. Europe is also well
aware of how the balance of world influence has gradually been shifting against
the US (although certainly not in military terms). Europeans do not applaud
this change as such, but understand that the rise of other world powers
represents future geopolitical reality.
Thus Europe, from its own perspective, is ironically in a much healthier
position if it now does assume primary responsibility for its own security in managing
the European political, economic, and social relationship with Russia. Once the
Cold War was over NATO essentially had become Washington’s chief instrument for
exerting dominant control over European security policy. That situation
increasingly tallies less with European strategic perceptions.
Trump’s crudeness thus finally provided the tipping point for new and long
overdue EU thinking about the European-Russian relationship under the new world
realities. NATO officials of course will never see it that way. But this
European reality will not likely be reversed by any US president.
And Europe is acutely aware that Putin’s policies in Europe will directly
reflect US policy steps against him. Russia is Russia; Neocon fantasies about
“solving the problem” by getting rid of Putin is bereft of any geostrategic or
historical understanding of reality. In a similar vein Europe does not wish to
buy into a confrontational position with China in Asia.
This is not to say that there will not be occasions for some kind of joint
western military presence to possibly bolster unstable situations in different
parts of the world down the road. But if Europe is to be enlisted into military
operations elsewhere in the world, Europe will have to decide independently where
and how its interests dictate.
America’s genius has always lain in its soft power, a commodity that sadly
seems in increasingly short supply.
Graham E. Fuller is a former
senior CIA official, author of numerous books on the Muslim World; his latest book
is “Breaking Faith: A novel of espionage and an American’s crisis of conscience
in Pakistan.” (Amazon, Kindle) www.grahamefuller.com


















